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The emotion of surprise entails a complex of immediate responses, such as cognitive
interruption, attention allocation to, and more systematic processing of the surprising
stimulus. All these processes serve the ultimate function to increase processing depth and
thus cognitively master the surprising stimulus. The present account introduces phasic
negative affect as the underlying mechanism responsible for this switch in operating
mode. Surprising stimuli are schema-discrepant and thus entail cognitive disfluency, which
elicits immediate negative affect. This affect in turn works like a phasic cognitive tuning
switching the current processing mode from more automatic and heuristic to more
systematic and reflective processing. Directly testing the initial elicitation of negative
affect by surprising events, the present experiment presented high and low surprising
neutral trivia statements to N = 28 participants while assessing their spontaneous facial
expressions via facial electromyography. High compared to low surprising trivia elicited
higher corrugator activity, indicative of negative affect and mental effort, while leaving
zygomaticus (positive affect) and frontalis (cultural surprise expression) activity unaffected.
Future research shall investigate the mediating role of negative affect in eliciting surprise-
related outcomes.
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IMMEDIATE NEGATIVE AFFECT IN SURPRISE
Surprise is a distinct emotional response to events that are
discrepant with the schema of a current situation (e.g., Smed-
slund, 1990; Meyer et al., 1991, 1997; Ekman, 2003). There
is no agreement in the literature on the particular valence of
surprise as an emotion. While some approaches label surprise
as a positive emotion (e.g., Fontaine et al., 2007; Valenzuela
et al., 2010), other argue that surprise has no valence at all
(e.g., Russell, 1980; Reisenzein and Meyer, 2009; Reisenzein et al.,
2012). However, there is growing indirect evidence that par-
ticularly the immediate phase of cognitive interruption during
surprise triggers negative affect (Noordewier et al., submitted).
In several independent lines of research in social psychology
it has been shown that inconsistencies, disruption, and lack
of structure are experienced as unpleasant (Elliot and Devine,
1994; Kay et al., 2009; Gawronski and Strack, 2012; Proulx
et al., 2012; Rutjens et al., 2013). For instance, Mendes et al.
(2007) found that targets who disconfirm a certain stereotype
schema, such as a Latino with high socio-economic status, or
an Asian with a southern accent, are liked less than stereotype-
consistent exemplars. More directly demonstrating a negative
component in surprise, Noordewier and Breugelmans (2013)
examined the spontaneous facial expressions of individuals who
were surprised by unexpected turning of events in TV shows.
Facial codings of these expressions showed negative overall
expressions.
The evolutionary function of surprise is to facilitate cognitive
mastering of unexpected events (Plutchik, 1980; Meyer et al.,
1991, 1997; Forabosco, 1992; Attardo, 1997). This is realized
by a whole emotion syndrome (Reisenzein, 2000) of attentional
and cognitive mechanisms that all serve an enhanced and more
thorough processing of the surprising stimulus: interruption of
ongoing mental operations (Meyer et al., 1991; Reisenzein, 2000),
behavioral freezing (Scherer et al., 2004), recruitment of executive
capacity (Näätänen, 1990), attention-allocation to the surprising
event (e.g., Darwin, 1872/1999; Ekman et al., 2002), and increase
in effortful processing (e.g., Meyer et al., 1991, 1997; Scherer,
2001; Horstman, 2006). As a consequence, surprising stimuli
are more elaborated cognitively (cf., sensemaking, Pezzo, 2003;
cognitive mastering, Attardo, 1997) and more likely remembered
at a later time (e.g., Schützwohl, 1998) in comparison to non-
surprising stimuli. In a dual-system perspective, surprise is thus
an effective functional switch between more automatic and rou-
tine processing to more effortful and reflective operations (Strack
and Deutsch, 2004), functioning like a cognitive tuning from
heuristic to systematic processing (Bless, 2001; Schwarz, 2002;
Deutsch and Strack, 2008). The question is how this switch
operates. Which powerful mechanism enables all these different
yet functionally converging processes?
In this paper, we propose phasic negative affect as a mecha-
nism. In the following, we argue that schema-discrepant events
evoke cognitive disfluency which in turn triggers negative affect
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that tunes the cognitive system to more systematic processing.
Thus, in contrast to earlier models that hold that schema-
discrepancy triggers surprise as an affectively neutral signal
directly (e.g., Meyer et al., 1997), we introduce negative affect as a
causal mediator between discrepancy and surprise. This procedu-
ral account of surprise lends insights from various cognitive and
social psychological frameworks and deepens our understanding
of the causal architecture of surprise.
SURPRISE AS COGNITIVE DISFLUENCY
A powerful psychological concept in explaining various phenom-
ena is processing fluency, which is the content-independent speed
and efficiency of ongoing mental operations (Reber et al., 2004),
such as perceptual (e.g., Reber et al., 1998), or semantic process-
ing (Whittlesea, 1993). High processing fluency elicits positive
affect (Winkielman and Cacioppo, 2001), while low processing
fluency elicits negative affect and more thorough processing
(Alter et al., 2007). There are various ways to manipulate flu-
ency experimentally, such as degrading and enhancing perceptual
clarity (Reber et al., 1998), repeated exposure (Moreland and
Topolinski, 2010), motor training (Topolinski and Strack, 2009c,
2010; Topolinski, 2010, 2012), or semantic priming (Whittle-
sea, 1993). Particularly semantic fluency is of particular interest
for the case of surprise. Previous research has shown that the
fluency of processing the meaning of a stimulus is facilitated
when this stimulus occurs in a semantically predictive context
(Whittlesea, 1993) or in semantic coherence with other stimuli
(Topolinski and Strack, 2008, 2009a,b,d). For instance, a coherent
word triple such like SALT DEEP FOAM (implying the common
topic SEA) is processed faster than an incoherent word triple like
BALL BOOK DREAM (implying no common topic; Topolinski,
2011).
How is surprise connected to fluency? According to the major
theories on surprise, a surprising event is defined as a stimulus or
stimulus change that is discrepant or inconsistent with the cur-
rently activated general schema of the situation (e.g., Smedslund,
1990; Meyer et al., 1991, 1997; Ekman, 2003). This may be the
case because the stimulus was not expected or the expectancy
of another stimulus or event had been evoked, like a sweet taste
when one has expected a sour taste (Teigen and Keren, 2003).
However, a conscious expectancy about an occurring event is
not necessary for surprise to occur. Any event that is inconsis-
tent with the current active schema will be surprising, even if
no conscious expectancy was held. For instance, running into
your house neighbor in a foreign airport is strongly surprising,
although you have not held conscious expectancies in mind
about the likelihoods of meeting certain people on the airport.
In terms of semantic processing, surprising events can thus be
conceptualized as events that are inconsistent with the currently
activated semantic context. Thus, these events elicit semantic
disfluency, which has been shown in previous research to evoke
certain psychological consequences. In the following we argue
that these consequences should also occur for surprising events.
SURPRISE, DISFLUENCY, AND NEGATIVE AFFECT
While relatively high processing fluency elicits positive affect,
low fluency prompts immediate negative feelings (Hajcak and
Foti, 2008; Topolinski et al., 2009; Hajcak, 2012). For instance,
low compared to high-fluent stimuli are liked less, judged as
being false, toxic, or less famous and funny (Topolinski and
Reber, 2010a,b; Topolinski and Strack, 2010; Leder et al., 2013;
Topolinski, 2014; Topolinski et al., 2014b). Such a phasic negative
affect, independent from fluency, has been shown to function like
negative mood in cognitive tuning, where negative compared to
positive affective states inhibit automatic and heuristic processes
and induce more systematic and effortful processing (e.g., Bless
et al., 1996; Kuhl, 2000; Baumann and Kuhl, 2002; Ruder and
Bless, 2003). For instance, phasic negative compared to positive
affect, when induced randomly, changing from trial to trial and
lasting only for around a second, decreases creative performance
(Topolinski and Deutsch, 2012), or inhibits automatic semantic
processing (Topolinski and Deutsch, 2013).
Crucially, also disfluency-triggered negative affect can function
as a rapid cognitive tuner to more systematic processing. Alter
et al. (2007) showed that experimentally induced disfluency facil-
itated systematic processing of syllogistic reasoning problems, a
core facility of reflective processing (Strack and Deutsch, 2004).
Applying this to surprising events, we argue that surprising
stimuli are cognitively disfluent (since they are schema-discrepant
by definition) and thereby elicit immediate negative affect that
then tunes cognitive processing from a more heuristic, impulsive
mode to a more systematic, effortful mode in the further course
of psychological functioning. It should be emphasized, however,
that this is a subtle negative state that is not necessarily conscious
(cf., Russell, 2003; Winkielman and Berridge, 2004; Topolinski
and Deutsch, 2012) and not a strong emotional experience. Thus,
we do not argue that this brief negative affect determines the
eventual experiential evaluation once the surprising event is fully
mastered. Of course, we can be positively surprised and feel joy in
response to unanticipated positive outcomes, or can be negatively
surprised by bad news. This eventual valence of the later surprise
feeling is rather determined by the valence of the event itself (see
also Noordewier and Breugelmans, 2013). Negative affect only
pertains to the immediate state when encountering a schema-
discrepant event.
In sum, we argue that negative affect is the mechanism trig-
gering a switch in operation mode from automatic or heuristic
processing to more controlled and effortful processing, as well
as all further attentional and motivational consequences such a
switch from heuristic to analytical processing brings along, such
as attention allocation and deeper processing (Meyer et al., 1991;
Reisenzein, 2000).
The crucial first prediction of this account, however, is that
surprising stimuli elicit negative affect. As already mentioned,
this has been shown recently by Noordewier and Breugelmans
(2013) for facial codings of TV show participants. However,
these expressions were coded as whole-face responses and did
not differentiate specific facial muscles indicative of more specific
affective responses. Because of this shortcoming, the present
study examined affective facial responses to surprising stim-
uli in a more controlled experimental set-up with a psycho-
physiological method, namely facial electromyography (EMG).
This also allowed to disentangle independent changes in positive
and negative affect (Winkielman and Cacioppo, 2001).
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AIM OF THE PRESENT RESEARCH
The present study tested the initial stage of affective consequences
of surprise as outlined above, the automatic elicitation of negative
affect. Note that the present scope was not about the further
cognitive consequences of surprise such as attentional allocation
or deeper processing. The current notion of (dis)fluency only
refers to the immediate online efficiency in encoding a stimulus,
not the later increased mental effort that is elicited by surprise.
As one operationalization of schema-discrepant, thus surprising,
information, we chose trivia statements that had been pre-rated
as being more or less surprising (Reisenzein, 2000). For the case
of trivia, the surprise and thus disfluency does not stem from
a situationally primed context or even expectancy, but from
the degree to which certain trivia are (in)consistent with our
chronically activated general knowledge structures (e.g., Bless et al.,
1996). Thus, surprising trivia do not match semantic knowledge
structure and thus exhibit semantic disfluency.
As a genuine indicator of spontaneous affect we assessed
spontaneous facial muscle activity via facial EMG (Cacioppo
et al., 1986; Dimberg et al., 2000; but see, for recent debate on
the coherence between affect and facial expression, Hassin et al.,
2013; Reisenzein et al., 2013). Specifically, three muscles were
investigated that have been shown to be indicative of affective
responses. The M. zygomaticus major, which raises the corner
of the lips in smiling, is indicative of positive affect (Cacioppo
et al., 1986; Scherer and Ellgring, 2007). The muscle has also been
shown to be associated with gains in processing fluency (Harmon-
Jones and Allen, 2001; Winkielman and Cacioppo, 2001), and
with semantic fluency. Topolinski et al. (2009) presented word
triples to participants who were told that these would be random
words and were asked to merely read over these triples. In some
of these triples, the words were not random but semantically
coherent (e.g., DEEP FOAM SALT all related to the common
concept of SEA), while in other triples the words were actually
random, that is, semantically incoherent (e.g., DREAM BALL
BOOK). It was found that participants showed higher zygomati-
cus activity for coherent than for random triples. This occurred
because coherent compared to incoherent triples were encoded
with a higher semantic fluency.
The M. corrugator supercilii, which furrows the brows, is
indicative of negative affective states (e.g., Ekman, 1973; Cacioppo
et al., 1986) and to difficulty in information processing, that is,
disfluency (Cacioppo et al., 1985; Cohen et al., 1992; see, for
inductions of subjective mental effort due to corrugator activa-
tion, Larsen et al., 1992; Stepper and Strack, 1993; Strack and
Neumann, 2000). In Topolinski et al. (2009), higher corrugator
activity was found during encoding of incoherent compared to
coherent semantic information. This makes the corrugator the
prime indicator of disfluency-triggered negative affect in the
present argumentation.
Finally, the M. frontalis medialis, which raises the eye brows,
surely is the prima facie indicator of surprise, since the iconic
surprise face in cultural displays and actors involves raised eye
brows (Scherer and Ellgring, 2007). And indeed, Topolinski et al.
(2009) found increased activity of the frontalis for the encoding
of incoherent (i.e., disfluent) semantic information compared
to coherent information. However, several other studies that
instantiated real surprising events in more ecologically valid ways,
such as changing a whole room, found only a weak impact on
frontalis activity (Reisenzein et al., 2006; Schützwohl and Reisen-
zein, 2012).
Following the current argumentation that surprise prompts
negative affect, we predicted increased corrugator activity for
highly compared to low surprising trivia statements (cf., Topolin-
ski and Strack, 2009b). Furthermore, we predicted lower zygo-
maticus activity for highly compared to low surprising stimuli
as disfluent surprising stimuli should elicit negative affect (cf.,
Winkielman and Cacioppo, 2001; Topolinski et al., 2009). Con-
cerning the frontalis, it remained an empirical question whether
frontalis would be susceptible to the present manipulation (see
Topolinski et al., 2009 vs. Reisenzein et al., 2006). We did not
implement any other measure (such as explicit affective ratings)
to ensure that participants’ facial responses reflected spontaneous
affective processes running independent from a conscious evalu-
ative mind-set or any demand effects.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Twenty-eight volunteers from various professional backgrounds
from the city area of Würzburg participated for a financial com-
pensation ofe10 (21 female, 7 male, Mage = 26, SDage = 5). They
were recruited via a local mini-job online market. The volunteers
were not screened for psychological or neurological disorders, and
due to anonymity issues, we did not record other demographic
variables such as ethnicity. Unfortunately, this sample size con-
fines the power of the present tests, but it is common for such
time-consuming and laborious methods (cf., Winkielman and
Cacioppo, 2001).
MATERIALS
Trivia statements were developed using the pool of quiz items
used in Reisenzein (2000).1 These original items were compounds
of questions with true and false answers. For instance, The inven-
tion of matches is attributed to?, Johnny Walker (correct answer),
and Robert Bosch (false answer). For these items, norming ratings
are available on how surprising the correct answer is to German
samples. In these norming ratings, N = 60 participants had rated
how surprising the given fact was to them. Using these ratings, 22
high-surprising (Msurprising_rating = 5.67, SD = 0.45) and 22 low-
surprising (Msurprising_rating = 1.80, SD= 0.66) facts were chosen,
with a strong resulting difference in normative ratings on surprise
in Reisenzein (2000), t(42) = 22.68, p < 0.001. Then, a trivia
statement was created by combining the initial question with the
correct answer, for instance The invention of matches is attributed
to Johnny Walker (highly surprising), or Women have a higher life
expectancy than men (low surprising). The stimuli (in German
language) are available from the first author upon request.
Manipulation check
To check whether these materials still elicited similar surprise
levels than in the rating by Reisenzein (2000), N = 12 individuals
similar in age and education to the main sample and being
1We thank Rainer Reisenzein for kindly supplying the whole stimulus pool
and norming ratings.
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ignorant about the current research thrust received these 44 items
and were asked to rate how surprising each item is (0 = not at all
surprising to 10= very surprising). As expected given the selection
of extreme items, there was a very large difference between the
items: (Mhigh_surprise_items = 6.97, SD = 1.00 vs. Mlow_surprise_items
= 2.10, SD= 0.90), t(11)= 15.17, p < 0.001, d = 5.23.
PROCEDURE
The study had ethical approval from the Deutsche Forschungsge-
meinschaft (Str 264/25-1). After informed consent, participants
were tested in single sessions. Participants were told that skin
conductance was measured by electrodes to cover the actual facial
muscle recording (see Dimberg et al., 2000). The trivia viewing
task was part of a larger experimental battery involving other,
unrelated tasks (studying non-sense words, Topolinski, 2012;
watching neutral geometric shapes, Topolinski et al., submitted).
In the trivia viewing task, participants were told that a recre-
ation phase in between two other tasks, necessary for physio-
technological reasons, would follow in which participants should
relax. For their entertainment, general trivia facts would be pre-
sented on the PC screen. They were not given any specific encod-
ing instruction but were asked to stay relaxed and watch the events
unfolding on the PC screen. Thus, participants simply read the
trivia statements, and no response or any task was required. Then,
in altogether 44 trials, 22 high surprising and 22 low surprising
trivia items were presented in random order, re-randomized anew
for each participant. In each trial, first a fixation cross appeared in
the middle of the screen for 1000 ms followed by a blank screen for
1100 ms. Then the trivia item was presented in black font in the
middle of screen for 6000 ms. Then, an inter-trial interval being
a white screen followed with a length randomly varying between
5000 and 6000 ms. The whole task took around 10 min.
EMG ASSESSMENT
The electrical activity was measured over the M. zygomaticus
major, the M. corrugator supercilii, and the M. frontalis medialis
on the left side of the face using bipolar placements of 13/7 mm
Ag/AgCl surface-electrodes (Fridlund and Cacioppo, 1986). The
impedances of all electrodes were reduced to less than 10 kOhm.
The EMG raw signal was measured with a V-Amp amplifier (Brain
Products Inc.), digitized by a 24-bit analog-to-digital converter,
and then stored on a computer with a sampling frequency of
500 Hz. These raw data were rectified offline and filtered with a
30 Hz low cutoff filter, a 500 Hz high cutoff filter, a 50 Hz notch
filter, and a 125 ms moving average filter.
To control for baseline activity, EMG scores were calculated
being the difference between the activity in the given trial and
a pre-stimulus level, namely the mean activity during the last
1000 ms before stimulus onset. Trials with an EMG activity above
8 µV during the baseline period and above 30 µV during the
stimuli presentation were excluded (<8%). Then, the EMG scores
were aggregated over the 6000 ms of trivia item presentation, for
high and for low surprising trivia, respectively.
RESULTS
The conditional means are shown in Figure 1. A 3 (muscle: zygo-
maticus, corrugator, frontalis; within) × 2 (trivia: high surprise,
FIGURE 1 | EMG activity as a function of surprise and muscle. Error bars
indicate ±1 SEM.
low surprise; within) analysis of variance (ANOVA) over the elec-
trodermal activity yielded a main effect of muscle, F(1,26)= 6.94,
p = 0.004, η2p = 0.35, with generally higher activity of the
corrugator compared to the other muscles overall, which is con-
ceptually irrelevant. Furthermore, a main effect of trivia surfaced,
F(1,27) = 6.04, p = 0.021, η2p = 0.19, with generally more
muscle activity for surprising than for common trivia. Crucially,
a marginal interaction between muscle and trivia was found,
F(1,26)= 3.15, p= 0.060, η2p = 0.20.
According to our predictions of a differential impact of sur-
prise on the single muscles, we ran single planned tests separately
for each muscle. For the corrugator, there was higher activity
during encoding of high surprising compared to low surprising
trivia, t(27) = 2.61, p = 0.014, d = 0.48, 95% CI [0.06, 0.53].
There were no effects of surprise on zygomaticus and frontalis
activity (both ts < 1.4, ps > 0.19), see also Figure 1. Corrugator
activity was reliably above zero for both high and low surprising
items (ts < 3.91, ps < 0.011). Zygomaticus activity was reliably
below zero for less surprising items, t(27)= 2.61, p= 0.015.
DISCUSSION
Examining the initial affective responses to neutral surprising
stimuli, we assessed spontaneous facial expressions during merely
reading high and low surprising trivia statements. As we had
argued, high compared to low trivia statements are inconsis-
tent with the individuals’ common knowledge structures (Bless
et al., 1996) and are thus cognitively disfluent, eliciting negative
affect (Alter et al., 2007; Topolinski et al., 2009; Noordewier
and Breugelmans, 2013). We found increased corrugator activity
for high surprising compared to low surprising trivia, while
zygomaticus and frontalis were not significantly affected. Before
discussing this result, it should be emphasized that the present
rather small sample confined the present statistical power, and
the present preliminary evidence should be interpreted with
caution.
This finding corroborates our assertation that surprise entails
an immediate negative affective state and provides more specific
evidence on facial expressions than whole-face codings (see also
Noordewier and Breugelmans, 2013). However, the present initial
demonstration is only a starting point for experimentally manip-
ulating and testing the whole procedural chain that we assume
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for surprise to be at work, and also to test the mediational role
of negative affect. The current evidence also allows the reversed
causal interpretation that negative affect is only a by-product
of the whole attentional and cognitive syndrome of surprise of
increased cognitive effort and cognitive mastering (Topolinski,
2014). Future studies should show that high compared to low
surprising events do not only elicit negative affect, but that this
negative affect in turn induces a more thorough processing of
surprising stimuli and is thus correlated with further psycholog-
ical consequences of surprise, such as attention allocation and
more reflective processing (Plutchik, 1980; Schützwohl, 1998;
Reisenzein, 2000). Furthermore, negative affect in the present set-
up might have stemmed not only from the initial dysfluency in
reading the trivia, but from frustration in additional stimulus
elaboration and memory-retrieval during failure of making sense
particularly of surprising items (cf., Pezzo, 2003). However, note
that the present time window of EMG measures was only the first
6 s after stimulus onset. Because (1) participants needed 1–2 s to
read the trivia in the first place, (2) memory retrieval and fact-
checking itself requires another 1–2 s (Collins and Quillian, 1969),
and (3) facial activity in response to higher mental processes
requires itself time to unfold, we argue that such additional
cognitive processes unlikely affected the current data.
A further limitation of the present evidence might be the
use of the corrugator muscle as an indicator of negative affect,
because the corrugator does not only mark negativity, but also
mental effort (Cacioppo et al., 1985; Cohen et al., 1992). It
could be argued that the presently found increased activity of
the corrugator muscle is rather due to higher mental effort or
increased processing depth in integrating the surprising com-
pared to the less surprising trivia statements. However, note that
the frontalis muscle was not affected by the present manipulation.
In the literature examining the facial responses to mental effort
more generally, whenever both corrugator and frontalis were
assessed, the frontalis muscle was affected by mental effort to
a comparable degree as the corrugator muscle (e.g., Van Boxtel
and Jessurun, 1993; Waterink and Van Boxtel, 1994; Waersted
and Westgaard, 1996; Bansevicius et al., 1997). Accordingly, the
frontalis has been conceptualized as an independent indicator of
mental effort (Van Boxtel and Ven, 1978; Fridlund and Cacioppo,
1986). In ergonomics, some authors even suggested frontalis
being the more valid indicator of mental effort because it is, in
contrast to the corrugator, not affected by valence (Zeier, 1979; de
Waard, 1996; Piechulla et al., 2003). The impact of the present
manipulation on corrugator but not on frontalis activity thus
favors our interpretation that negative affect, but not mental
effort per se, drove the present responses. However, convergent
validity of this facial measure should be obtained in future studies
using other measures of negative affect, such as evaluations or
approach–avoidance movements (e.g., Topolinski et al., 2014c).
Also, although the present item pool was already successfully
used in earlier publications (e.g., Reisenzein, 2000), it is still
possible that the present items elicited not only surprise, but also
confusion or annoyance, which should be disentangled in future
studies.2
2We thank the reviewer for these thoughts.
The missing impact of surprise on frontalis activity, which
is the prima facie muscle for iconic cultural displays of surprise
(for a discussion, see Noordewier and Breugelmans, 2013), might
be regarded as being at odds with earlier findings that frontalis
is reliably affected by highly surprising events (e.g., Reisenzein
et al., 2006). However, detectable frontalis activity in these earlier
studies was either weak or occurred in only up to a third of the
observed participants (Reisenzein, 2000; Reisenzein et al., 2006;
Schützwohl and Reisenzein, 2012). Given that the trivia items
we used were not validated in the present participant pool, it
could well be possible that they did not elicit enough surprise to
trigger frontalis activity (which is weak as it is). Future research is
necessary to further ascertain the role of frontalis in the display of
surprise.
The null-finding on zygomaticus activity was not predicted
and deserves some discussion. In contrast to earlier findings that
high compared to low fluency increases zygomaticus activity, thus
induced positive affect independent from changes in negative
affect (Winkielman and Cacioppo, 2001; Topolinski et al., 2009)
we found no impact of surprise on zygomaticus activity. The first
possible explanation of course is lacking power, since the present
sample size was small (but similar to earlier studies in this domain,
e.g., Winkielman and Cacioppo, 2001). However, the direction
of the difference in zygomaticus activity was, descriptively, even
opposite to what would be expected on fluency grounds: partici-
pants exhibited descriptively higher zygomaticus activity for high-
than low-surprising items.
This can be explained by the relativity of fluency effects
(Hansen et al., 2008; Hansen and Topolinski, 2011), as revealed by
a closer comparison between the earlier EMG study on semantic
fluency (Topolinski et al., 2009) and the present study. In Topolin-
ski et al. (2009), participants received coherent and incoherent
word triples and were told that these word triples were random.
In addition to this information, one would usually not expect
a regularity in word groups in general. Thus, coherent triples
showed an unusual fluency gain, higher than one would expect
when reading random word groups, eliciting a positive affect
(as evidenced by increased zygomaticus activity, but also higher
liking ratings, Topolinski and Strack, 2009a,d). In the present
study, however, participants received high and low surprising
trivia statements. Here, low surprising trivia, although of course
having higher semantic fluency than highly surprising trivia, did
not exhibit an usually high fluency compared to what one would
expect during reading trivia statements in general. Thus, an unusual
fluency gain and thus positive affect were less likely to occur in
the present set-up. However, future research should more closely
investigate the respective impact of semantic fluency on positive
and negative facial responses under different fluency expectations.
Finally, it is also possible that the present trivia statements were
simply more complex than the word triples in Topolinski et al.
(2009), imposing higher cognitive demand on participants and
thereby inhibiting zygomaticus activity more generally.
Finally, a conceptual integration between the present account
and earlier highly influential accounts on the mechanism of
surprise should be made. While we completely concur with most
aspects of the model provided by Meyer and Reisenzein (e.g.,
Meyer et al., 1991; Reisenzein, 2000), the difference between both
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accounts is that Meyer et al. (1991) assume that unexpectedness
or schema-discrepancy triggers the neutral state of surprise along
with all its components directly, while we assume that discrepancy
impacts on the cognitive architecture via the link of brief negative
affect. We add this mechanistic assumption because we do not
know of any plausible perceptual, cognitive, or (other) affec-
tive route by which schema-discrepancy should directly causally
change the information processing mode (as assumed by Meyer
and Reisenzein). Given the previous independent evidence that
disfluency triggers negative affect and modulates processing style
(e.g., Winkielman and Cacioppo, 2001; Alter et al., 2007), negative
affect is an obvious candidate to effectuate such a modulation; and
the detection of brief negative affect in the present experiment is
first supporting evidence for our claim. Furthermore, if unexpect-
edness directly triggers a change in processing mode without any
further mediator (like in the model by Meyer and Reisenzein), the
question is why immediate brief negative affect did occur in the
present study as well as in Noordewier and Breugelmans (2013).
Thus, we deem the assumption that schema-discrepancy modu-
lates the cognitive operational mode by triggering a brief negative
affect as the most parsimonious interpretation and integrative
interpretation of the present and earlier findings.
Concluding, the present evidence showed immediate negative
facial responses to neutral stimuli that were more or less surpris-
ing. Future research should map the mediating role of negative
affect in eliciting further cognitive consequences of surprise.
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